Ukraine War: Documented Western IT components in Russian weapons technology
Researchers have listed how many Western IT components are in Russia’s weapon systems. According to reports, components were delivered despite sanctions.
A recently published report by the British military think tank Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) has it all: On 55 pages, the scientists list which components are used in Russian weapon systems. These include a number of products from Western suppliers – some of which were already subject to sanctions or at least export bans before Russia attacked Ukraine in February. However, according to reports, some of the components still find their way to Russia.
The RUSI researchers examined a total of 27 weapon systems and found a large number of components from western suppliers. According to the researchers, for example, the Iskander cruise missile, which can also be equipped with nuclear warheads, contains chips from Texas Instruments, including a DSP. According to RUSI, the WLAN module of the Orlan 10 reconnaissance drone should also come from TI.
German model construction technology in the Kamikaze drone
11 components in Russian weapon systems are said to come from the production of German suppliers, such as EPCOS, which now belongs to TDK Electronics. The Kamikaze drone KUB-BLA should also contain some components from the Swabian model construction specialists Aero Naut, writes RUSI. The think tank also claims to have identified chips and components from AMD, Intel and Infineon or their respective subsidiaries.
“Russia’s military might hangs on a silicon lifeline that runs from the US through the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and France, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan,” the authors write. The core question of the report, the RUSI authors believe, is whether this lifeline would be cut – and whether others would fill this gap. Russia’s semiconductor industry itself is not able to do this. However, a substitution of Western products may not be absolutely necessary at the moment: the sanctions do not seem to have as strong an impact as politically hoped.
Infineon sees “overcompliance with sanctions”
The Reuters news agency, citing Russian customs data available to it, reports that even after the war began on February 24, 2022, thousands of deliveries arrived in Russia. Some of the deliveries are said to have already been in transit and were only dispatched after the start of the war – but some were also new deliveries. Infineon alone is said to have identified 450 deliveries in internal investigations by the end of May; Reuters, on the other hand, says nearly 2,500 shipments have gone to the Russian Federation since the end of February.
When asked by voonze online, the semiconductor manufacturer based in Neubiberg near Munich said it was “difficult to control subsequent sales over the entire lifetime of a product.” Last but not least, this means resale by buyers in third countries.
Infineon has “taken all the measures available to us to ensure compliance with the sanctions – not just the wording, but also the spirit. This led to a delivery stop for us from the start and thus to the sanctions being exceeded.” Deliveries to Russia and to the areas occupied by Russia were stopped at the beginning of the war, and deliveries to Belarus have also been since March. Sales partners have also been instructed worldwide to take measures against diversions.
The dual use question
The RUSI researchers also admit that some components are suitable for both civilian and military use. Some such dual-use products are subject to a special regulation in the EU, which was revised in 2021 and expressly includes Russia as a regulated target country.
However, this only applies to exports from the territory of the EU – as soon as a subsidiary in a non-EU country manufactures a product, the dual-use regulation does not apply. For their study, the RUSI researchers managed to identify certain importers that are assigned to the procurement of the Russian military and Russian armaments companies, such as Rostec, Uralvagonzavod or Rosoboronexport.
“Ongoing dialogue” on sanctions
Many of the actors listed in the report are meanwhile reticent. An inquiry about the actual control options at the Federal Office of Economics and Export Control (BAFA) has so far remained unanswered. The Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology under Robert Habeck (Greens), which is politically responsible for export controls and the chip industry, did not comment on the matter on request, generally referred to the sanctions lists and the BAFA, as well as to the fact that there was an “ongoing dialogue” among the western supporters of the admitting Ukraine to the sanctions.
In the coalition agreement, the SPD, the Greens and the FDP agreed to pass an arms export control law that has been in the works for several months. “For weapon technology developments in biotech, hypersonic, space, cyber and AI, we will take initiatives for arms control at an early stage,” the coalition agreement also says.
The way through non-authorized distributors
TDK Technologies states that it was not aware of the use of its own passive electronic components prior to the RUSI report. “We have established strict export control mechanisms for our products. In addition, it is anchored in internal TDK guidelines as well as in our supply agreements and customer contracts that products from TDK Electronics may not be used in military applications,” a spokesman explained to voonze online. TDK Technologies stopped supplying products to the Russian Federation with the start of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. Nevertheless, it cannot be completely ruled out that individual elements will find their way into the Russian Federation, for example via unauthorized distributors.
When asked by voonze online, the CDU defense expert Roderich Kiesewetter called for a strict surveillance regime for Western semiconductors. He is aware of proceedings before the Dresden Higher Regional Court against a German citizen who is said to have sold dual-use goods to Russia in recent years. “This shows that there may well have been violations in the past,” says Kiesewetter. Russia could try to replace Western products with components such as semiconductors from third countries. “Nevertheless, this will not be possible to the extent required,” estimates the CDU member of the Bundestag. “It is all the more important to strictly monitor these very effective sanctions in the technology sector.”
(axk)
